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Thank you for the invitation.  It is a pleasure for me to speak on the topic of 
extended collective licenses (“ECL”), a model for managing copyright which is 
typical for Scandinavian countries.  Although my Danish is a bit rusty—not to 
speak of my Swedish—I come from Belgium, a country which is neither a Nordic 
nor a Southern European country, but which at least has a strong experience with 
collective bargaining.  It is difficult to understand the model of ECLs without the 
background of collective bargaining (in a country like the United States, private 
agreements rather than collective bargaining do play a prominent role).  Belgian 
culture in the field of industrial relations is one in which labor issues are solved 
with collective agreements; this is possible because of the existence of very strong 
organizations representing employers and employees and the possibility for the 
collective agreements concluded between those organizations to be extended by 
law to third parties.  The ECL model relies on the willingness and experience of 
parties to engage in collective bargaining. 
My speech will cover three parts.  First, I will briefly discuss the problems and 
some possible solutions.  Second, I will explain what we have in the European 
Union concerning ECLs.  Lastly, I will discuss whether ECLs are compatible with 
international norms—in particular with the norms of the Berne Convention—and 
the issues of formalities, rights and exceptions. 
ECLs are a way to solve the problem of outsiders.  I think that there are different 
types of outsiders.  First, there are the nonmembers of collecting societies, meaning 
the third parties enjoying the same nationality as the collecting society.  A second 
category of outsiders includes the foreigners and, because I come from the 
European Union, I will distinguish between foreigners from the European Union 
and foreigners from the rest of the world.  Finally, there is the problem of unknown 
parents in the case of orphan works, which is of course very important in relation to 
the Google Book settlement.  These three categories of persons are outsiders.  To 
negotiate with nonmembers is easier than to approach foreigners, not to speak of 
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unknown and sometimes dead parents.  ECLs propose a solution to solve the 
problem of outsiders and a way to reduce the high transaction costs resulting from 
separate negotiations with all those outsiders. 
How do we define an ECL?  An ECL is a license agreement that is freely 
negotiated between a collective management organization and a user, and which is 
later extended by law to the works of outsiders.  So, there are basically three 
elements.  First, there is an agreement based on a negotiation; this is the voluntary 
aspect of ECLs.  Second, there is the extension effect, which aims at integrating 
outsiders within the scope of the agreement.  Third, this extension effect is realized 
by virtue of the law.  It is important to stress that outsiders nevertheless retain their 
exclusive rights until the extension effect takes place.  In certain ECLs—we will 
see that different types of ECLs exist—there is the possibility for outsiders to opt 
out. 
Do we have a provision in E.U. law that provides for an ECL?  We have some 
kind of ECL at the E.U. level for a special use—namely cable retransmissions of 
broadcasts.  ECLs are now being discussed in Brussels as a possible legislative tool 
for the digitalization and online display or communication to the public of orphan 
works.  Article 9 of the Cable and Satellite Directive provides an exclusive right for 
cable retransmission, but it is associated with a mandatory collective management 
system.1  This cable retransmission right, which is an exclusive right, can only be 
exercised through a collecting society.  The problem of the outsiders is resolved in 
the second part of article 9, where there is a presumption that “the collecting 
society which manages rights of the same category shall be deemed to be mandated 
to manage” the rights of outsiders, meaning the rights holders who have not 
transferred the management of their rights to a collecting society.2  This provision 
on mandatory collective management preserves competition because the right 
owner keeps the possibility to choose among collecting societies. 
Do we have another provision on ECLs at E.U. level?  No.  However, one recital 
of the “Information Society” Directive says, “[t]his Directive is without prejudice 
to the arrangements in the Member States concerning the management of rights 
such as extended collective licenses.”3  Thus, ECLs are presented as a management 
system in this Directive.  Except for cable retransmission, the E.U. framework does 
not provide for ECLs, but admits their existence under national laws. 
ECLs started in the 1960s in the Nordic countries and were designed for 
broadcasters. Today, we have a collection of different users which are covered in 
the Nordic countries by ECLs, including digital users for uses related to archiving, 
educational institutions, libraries, museums and so on.  ECLs are specific.  There is, 
however, one particular provision in Danish law that creates a general omnibus 
provision on ECLs.4  This broad provision covers potentially different users, while 
 
 1. Council Directive 93/83, art. 9, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15, 20 (EEC). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 11 (EC). 
 4. Danish Copyright Act [DCA] § 50 (the current Danish Act is Lovbekendtgarelse No. 202 of 
Feb. 27, 2010).  An English language version of the DCA is available at www.kum.dk. 
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usually Nordic countries only have ECLs for specific use and for specific users. 
Now, you might have heard a few days ago that the European Commissioner in 
charge of the E.U. internal market—and thus in charge of the legislation concerning 
copyright—has announced that a proposal will be released in the next few months 
to solve the issue of orphan works in the European Union.  Officials from the 
European Commission have already worked on different options to solve the 
orphan works issue.  One such option is changing the rules on the copyright 
exceptions.  I do not think that this is a good option because it would take at least 
ten years for the law to be enforced in E.U. member states—five years to adopt the 
directive and then five years to transpose it into the member states’ legislation as is 
required for directives.  Other options have been proposed, such as a specific pan-
European cross border license for online display, or a system of mutual recognition 
of national systems, including of the national ECL systems that exist in the Nordic 
countries.5  A fourth option would be to have an ECL at the E.U. level. 
Can we have an ECL at the E.U. level for solving the problem of orphan books?  
The ECL model has been used already in one country, Norway, for a national 
digital library called Bokhylla.6  The question is whether we can export that at the 
E.U. level.  One of the issues relates to the extension effect.  I mentioned that ECLs 
require an extension by law, but of course the extension by copyright law cannot go 
beyond the national borders as we do not have any European copyright, but only 
twenty-seven national copyrights.  As long as there is no copyright title valid for 
the whole European Union, we cannot have an extension effect across borders. 
Now, in this third and last part of this brief intervention, I will discuss whether 
ECLs respect the international norms on copyright.  The first international norm to 
review is Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, which prohibits any formality for 
the enjoyment or the exercise of rights to works of foreign origins.7  Of course, 
ECLs do not affect the enjoyment of rights because exclusive rights are still in the 
hands of the authors, but ECLs affect the exercise of those rights.  Do ECLs impose 
a formality on the exercise of the rights?  I do not want to give a final answer here 
because it is quite a complicated issue.  But let me just make some brief comments.  
Of course, a “formality” in the sense of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention goes 
beyond written formalities.8  In the ECL model, the authors do not have to become 
members of the collective management organization (“CMO”).  The law-made 
extension effect for outsiders obviates the need for authors to be members of the 
CMO; thus, no requirement and no formality here.  Now, the collective 
negotiations between the CMO and the user define the conditions for use, and those 
conditions are extended by law.  Is it a formality?  I have tried to find an answer in 
the best books on the Berne Convention.  For instance, Jane Ginsburg and Sam 
 
 5. See Tilman Lueder, The “Orphan Works” Challenge (Apr. 8, 2010) (unpublished paper 
distributed at the 2010 Fordham Intellectual Property Law and Policy conference), available at 
http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/TilmanLueder.pdf. 
 6. See BOKHYLLA, http://www.nb.no/bokhylla (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
 7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5(2), July 24, 1971, 
25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne]. 
 8. Id. 
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Ricketson consider that the statutory obligation to assert moral rights under the 
U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (s. 77(1)) is a formality, and thus 
probably not compatible with Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention.9 
Now the question is, in relation to the Google Book settlement, whether the 
intervention of a judge who has to approve a class action settlement might be 
considered a formality under the Berne Convention.  We can start the discussion 
today; I am not sure we will easily find an answer. 
Next issue:  which rights belonging to copyright are involved when books are 
digitized and included in digital libraries?  Two issues must be distinguished.  
There is the reproduction issue, with the scanning of the book at the beginning of 
the process and later the downloading of the e-book, if downloading e-books is 
allowed.  It is difficult to claim that Article 9 of the Berne Convention does not 
apply to those acts.10  The applicability of the exceptions to the reproduction right 
is, however, more controversial.  The issue of online display (notion of U.S. 
copyright law) or online communication to the public (notion of E.U. copyright 
law) is much more complicated.  Again, I do not want to discuss this issue in detail 
because it is very complex under the Berne Convention.  In brief:  we do not have a 
“general communication to the public” right under the Berne Convention, so we 
have to play with the different types of rights of Article 11 and following of the 
Berne Convention, which apply to different types of works and are subject to 
complex restrictions.11  But at least we have Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, which clearly covers online display and communications.12 
The next issue is whether ECLs are an exception or a limitation to those rights.  
With an ECL, exclusive rights are preserved, which indicates at first sight that an 
ECL should not be equated with an exception to copyright.  However, at the same 
time, the author cannot exercise her rights; only the CMO can.  The author cannot 
individually negotiate and the outsiders are affected in the absence of any express 
mandate.  So, an ECL works in practice as an exception.  If it is an exception, then 
the exception has to respect the international constraints, and for scanning and 
downloading, we have the three step test, which is a limitation for any exception to 
copyright.13  For online display/communication to the public, it is perhaps a little 
more complicated because the argument can be made that because compulsory 
licenses are allowed under the Berne provision, ECLs should be allowed as well. 
The three step test is my last point before the conclusion.  This three step test 
 
 9. 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING 
RIGHTS:  THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 326 (2d ed. 2005). 
 10. Berne, supra note 7, art. 9. 
 11. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 9, at 730. 
 12. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 
65. 
 13. See Berne, supra note 7, art. 9(2).  Article 9(2) provides: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such 
works [1] in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction [2] does not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and [3] does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the author. 
Id. 
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appears in different international instruments, such as in the Berne Convention and 
in Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive.14 
Under the test, limitations must firstly be limited to certain special cases.  This 
means that the exceptions should be narrow in scope, exceptional and quite precise 
and clearly defined.  It should be for some foreseeable scope and for specified 
purposes.  So, it basically means that you probably have to know to which right it 
applies, what kinds of works are subject to it and then what kind of beneficiaries 
and persons are covered. 
The commentaries on the second step of the test (no conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work) are numerous.  I think that the ECL likely does not 
conflict with the normal exploitation as a remuneration will be paid to the authors 
in exchange for the authorized use. This step will thus be more easily respected 
than the first one. 
Finally, ECLs are likely to be compatible with the third prong of the test:  that 
limitations shall not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the author.15 
A few words to conclude.  Under the ECL model, collective management 
becomes the normal exploitation of works.  If we see the ECLs model expanding in 
the digital world, it becomes more important to have rules concerning CMOs 
ensuring they are representative, accountable and transparent.  The possible 
adoption of ECLs for online issues and digital libraries thus also requires a fine 
regulation of the CMOs, which do play a key role in the ECL model. 
The final point is that the outsider issue, and in particular the issue of orphan 
works (or unknown parents) is probably solved by ECLs, but in practice ECLs 
were not convincing in solving the foreigner issue.  In most ECL schemes, 
foreigners do not get the remuneration they deserve for the use of their works.  
ECLs tend to work in favor of the local authors, including the nonmembers of 
CMOs.  Therefore, the existing national ECLs that we have in Europe are not 
entirely satisfactory.  Finally, with increasing online users, we have, at least in 
Europe, a terrible challenge linked to the territoriality of copyright because we do 
not have any E.U.-wide copyright title.  As long as we lack such a pan-European 
copyright, the complex issues with online uses and with the licensing of works 
throughout the whole European Union will remain.  Territoriality is definitely not 
adapted to the online world of copyright. 
 
 
 14. See Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 3, art. 5(5). 
 15. See Berne, supra note 7, art. 9(2) (“[S]uch reproduction . . . does not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the author.”). 
